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LEBANESE POLITICAL PARTIES AND ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM: AN IMPOSSIBLE PROMISE?

Nader Ahmad
Nada Al Maghlouth

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List of Acronyms

CDR: Council for Reconstruction and Development

CFD: Central Fund for the Displaced

CIB: Central Inspection Board

CSB: Civil Service Board

DRM: Democratic Renewal Movement

ENA: National School of Administration

FM: Future Movement

FPM: Free Patriotic Movement

GDC: General Disciplinary Council

LCPS: Lebanese Centre for Political Studies

LF: Lebanese Forces

NSSF: National Social Security Fund

OMSAR: Office of the Minister of State of Administrative Reform

PSP: Progressive Socialist Party

ISO: International Organisation for Standardisation

Executive Summary

T his study aims to focus on how political parties in Lebanon responded to administrative failure and corruption in public administration, and how they addressed administrative reform in their agenda as well as their internal discourse. It presents political parties' approaches to administrative reform by examining their perceptions and agendas, initiatives, challenges, and the experiences of their MPs, deputies and ministers involved in administrative reform. The study also focuses on how political parties structure their internal administration by examining the mechanisms through which they appoint or elect their executive committees, manage internal elections, recruit administrators, consultants, and party members, evaluate performance, and manage transparency and accountability. It aims to understand the structural, operational, and political dynamics that shape the context in which administrative reform is implemented by engaging with the main stakeholders in this discussion.

None of the political parties interviewed in this study presented any concrete strategies dedicated exclusively to administrative reform within the state. As a result, discussions rather focused on political parties' perceptions of administrative reform, as well as some of their recommendations and reform-related advocacy campaigns. The findings reveal a number of recommendations set by political parties towards administrative reform within the state. These recommendations include decentralization, e-governance, privatization and private sector partnerships. Perspectives and expectations towards these priorities however often differed in their approach and purpose.

Although it was revealed that the same objectives were held in common across many interviewed parties, **few parties seemed to be collaborating and creating alliances based on common reform goals, but rather worked individually on entirely different action plans and recommendations.** While the majority of parties saw decentralization and privatization as key components of administrative reform, each party had its own approach to achieve that goal. Unsurprisingly none of the strategies presented have been implemented. While the Office of the Minister of State of Administrative Reform (OMSAR) was established by the Lebanese government in 1993, its strategies were non-binding to government institutions, including the human resources management (HRM) Units, as well as many other projects, draft laws, and recommendations.

All political parties agreed that political consensus (or the lack-there-of) is often a barrier to reform. They alluded to the power-sharing structure engrained into public administration as an extension of the political power-sharing system[1]. The administrative dysfunction of control agencies such as the Central Inspection Board (CIB) was also cited by political parties to be linked to the power-sharing structure found in public administration. All political parties interviewed saw that the state's control agencies are in need of reform, since none of these agencies are regarded as independent bodies.

Another more direct embodiment of sectarian power-sharing and obstacle facing administrative reform can be seen in quasi-governmental institutions. Political parties such as the Democratic Renewal Movement (DRM), the Lebanese Forces (LF), and Kataeb referred to the excessive

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1. High and middle-rank positions in public administration are perceived by the majority of political parties as an extension of their power and a natural right to be claimed on behalf of the sect they claim to represent.

jurisdictions of quasi-governmental institutions such as the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR), Council of the South, the Fund for the Displaced, and several other Parliamentary Committees as particularly problematic. Kataeb and the LF accused quasi-governmental organisations of usurping public sector responsibilities; while the FM argued that reforming any of the quasi-governmental institutions necessitate reforming all as most of these institutions have a sectarian majority.

Furthermore, the majority of parties including the FM, Hezbollah, Kataeb, Al-jamah, and DRM cited **institutional discontinuity** as a contributing challenge to administrative reform, given that ministers are under no obligation to uphold the plans or reforms of their predecessors. More importantly, nearly all parties interviewed identified the lack of political consensus and political sectarianism as the main challenge to reform. While some parties cite the lack of political consensus as being the primary barrier impeding them from implementing reform strategies, other parties cite political sectarianism as inherently unfertile grounds for reform. This is in line with several authors who argued that Lebanon's power-sharing structure crystalizes sectarian identities, invites political deadlock, and prevents the emergence of cross-sectarian political mobilization, leading to cyclical domestic crises that invite external interventions (Salloukh, 2015).

Despite the fact that **all parties identified recruitment and management of public servants as an area in need of reform, particularly due to the infiltration of patron-client relationships in public posts,** none of the parties interviewed believed that merit-based employment in public services positions was conceivable in light of a sectarian-based system. At best, a merit-based sectarian system of employment was suggested by Hezbollah. Quotas, as opposed to meritocracy, are the soul determinant of who manages public life in Lebanon. In other words, entitlement for power is earned on sectarian grounds and permitted by political opportunity. All political parties argued that this is the unfortunate truth to which they are all subjugated.

The study reveals that the majority of political parties' internal administrations and control agencies, with the exception of Al-jama'ah, can be described as highly centralised and dependent on the authority and vision of the president and his often appointed executive board. In addition, little comprehensive administrative reform was recorded at the level of parties' internal administrations. This reveals that the nature of the authority that exists within political parties and how they are managed internally reflects the nature of authority that exists in public administration at the larger level, in that this authority is highly centralized, and is dependent on the president and executive powers and its political decisions rather than on its institutional prerogative as well as individual autonomy and creativity. Legitimacy to occupy leading administrative positions within the majority of political parties' administrative configurations is derived from candidates' seniority of loyalty and the level of intimate comradery and trust they sharewith the founder(s). However, perhaps due to its religious character and the absence of a national political founder, Al-jama'ah appeared to be more democratic compared to other political parties when it comes to their internal administration as well as human resources management. A higher value was placed on abstract rules and regulations when it comes to their organisational behavior within the administrative configurations of the party, and which to a large extent reflected the party's dedication to work with parliamentary committees on administrative development.

To conclude, the main problem with public administration in Lebanon as well as in any administration is unearned entitlement. Despite that all political parties agreed that patronage and clientele employment facilitated by the supply and demand relationship between the political party and the citizen in the public sector is a vital barrier for administrative reform, many of them claimed

that they have no choice but to submit to this political reality. Lebanese political parties' claims that they represent particular sectarian communities renders their claims for administrative positions a natural right as oppose to an entitlement to be earned. Inversely, political officials' accountability for any misconduct related to their public duties in these entitlements is perceived as an attempt to prosecute or exclude the community behind the official from political decisions. As a result, and as shown in the findings below, the corporate power-sharing extends into the public sector in the form of sectarian quotas and allocation of entitlement and privileges. The power sharing system that dominates the political life in Lebanon leaves little hope for reform as political parties have no reason to give up their share in the state's resources except if they are forced to.

Chapter One: Introduction

Until the recent election of President Michel Aoun on October 31st 2016, more than two and a half years had passed since the beginning of Lebanon's presidential vacuum, during which the parliament had convened over 40 times to elect a new president without reaching a quorum. Elected in 2009, the parliament had extended its term twice since 2012. Due to the presidential vacuum, the Council of Ministers had taken over the executive jurisdictions of the president. Government control agencies were paralyzed, and civil society organisations and rights based campaigns took to the streets demanding reform, social justice and accountability. Basic public services such as waste management, water and electricity continued to be dysfunctional, healthcare and welfare services needed reform, while garbage filled the streets due to the government's inability to manage the public procurement process of waste management. Whereas recent social movements have targeted government corruption, the government, although its constituents agreed that corruption is evident, maintained its public discourse, charging political and security issues as the primary obstructions to administrative reform.

The line between politics and public administration is almost indiscernible in Lebanon; however, the disciplinary question of whether public administrations are political institutions as such is still debated in the field. The origin of public administration seems to suggest that they are, despite the fact that much of the literature surrounding this subject deals with public administration as a bureaucratic entity expected to operate independently from government politics. In order for this to be true, public service posts must be filled by independent candidates unaffiliated to any particular political party. Historically, this has rarely been the case. In Lebanon, administrative posts have been most commonly filled through appointments based on patronage, loyalty, or political affiliation. In cases where administrative positions in the public sector are filled through elections, elected representatives are considered based on their political/sectarian representation. **Control over administration (from the point of sects and their political representatives), particularly through the system of political quotas on recruitment of public officials and civil servants, meant control over the power relations within the political system.**

Although Lebanon has had several successful reform attempts, most significant of which were the reforms of the Chehabi era (1958-1964) which instated several public services and institutions still operating today, many of these services and institutions, such as the National Social Security Fund (NSSF) and the Central Inspection Board (CIB), have been absorbed into the political/sectarian system, there by rendering them dysfunctional and limited in reach and scope. During the first Hariri era (1992-1998), OMSAR was established in response to the need for administrative reform during the post-war reconstruction period, as well as in response to foreign donors such as the World Bank (El Zein, 2003). **OMSAR identified the main problems as outdated organisational structures, laws, regulations and customs governing work-procedures in most ministries and public institutions, a disequilibrium in staff distribution, and a shortage of modern management and technology skills, as well as a lack of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) infrastructure and systems.** In response, several OMSAR Ministers drafted strategies and a survey of recommendations[2] for administrative reform, however, these strategies have not led to measurable change. In light of the indifference and resistance of the status quo, OMSAR's role is limited to being a "prototype of a model organisation: the blueprint upon which all subsequent restructuring should be based" [3] rather than a government agency capable of implementing concrete reform.

2. (OMSAR, 2011) (Fouad el-Saad, 2001) (Karim Bakradouni, 2003)
3. (OMSAR, 2016)

Despite the Lebanese government's mismanagement and corruption, transparency continues to be the focus of much of the research by the NGO and academic community in Lebanon. A study by Salti & Chaaban (2010) surveys the role of sectarianism in public expenditure, while local NGOs such as Beyond Reform and Development and the Lebanese Centre for Policy Studies (LCPS) have published numerous policy recommendations for administrative reform[4]. However, the government's response to these recommendations was a characteristic reaction of sporadic reforms, inconclusive projects, and unrealized goals. The purpose of this study is to delineate the relationship between politics and public administration in Lebanon, by examining political parties' current practices in public administration, and their strategies and visions for administrative reform. The argument for the separation of politics and administration is based on the notion that while policy-making is political, policy implementation is administrative. This assumption raises many questions, including whether the reform deadlock in Lebanon exists at the policy-making level or at the level of implementation, and the extent to which policy implementation in Lebanon is administrative as opposed to political. Uncovering the relationship between politics and public administration might shed light on how and why administrative reform continues to be a hurdle for Lebanon.

This study focuses on political parties' approaches to administrative reform by examining their reform strategies and agendas, initiatives, challenges, and the experiences of their MPs, deputies and ministers involved in administrative reform. This study also focuses on how political parties structure their internal administration by examining the mechanisms through which they appoint their executive committees, manage internal elections, recruit administrators, consultants, and party members, evaluate performance, and manage transparency and accountability. The aim of this study is to understand the structural, operational, and political dynamics that shape the context in which these reforms are drafted and implemented by engaging with the main stakeholders in this discussion. To this end, it engages in the following research questions:
1- How do political parties address administrative reform at the state level in Lebanon?
2- How do political parties address administrative reform internally within their parties?

Before delving into the methodology and the findings, the following chapter provides a brief history of the development of public administration in Lebanon. The findings of this study are discussed in the following three chapters. Chapter four presents political parties' overall approaches for administrative reform in particular, as well as recurring administrative reform trends and recommendations. Each theme discusses the different perspectives with which political parties approach the same type of strategy or reform. Political parties who did not have a specific opinion or clear stance on particular themes or administrative reform measures were not mentioned under respective theme-related sections in all chapters. Chapter five presents major challenges facing administrative reform with political parties' current priorities, as well as the relationship between power-sharing and the feasibility of administrative reform from the point of view of political parties. And finally, chapter six presents some of the major internal administrative configurations within political parties as well as their internal reform attempts.

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4. E.g. (Beyond Reform and Development, 2012), (Alberti & Sayed, 2007)

Chapter Two: A Brief History of Public Administration in Lebanon

This section provides a brief examination of the political history of public administration in Lebanon, including its establishment during Ottoman and French colonialism, its evolution post-independence, and its eventual breakdown during and after the civil war (1975-1990). It highlights some of the main political developments that played an instrumental role in the development of public administration in Lebanon, and some of the underlying causes and political opportunities and constraints that have contributed to the state of public administration today.

The short-lived evolution

With French withdrawal and the Lebanese independence granted in 1943, the institutionalization of political sectarianism was complete. Lebanese public administration was thus forged through its colonial experience. Lebanon had a relatively successful reform experience, however short lived, during the Chehabi period. In the late 1950s, President Fouad Chehab made administrative strides in terms of social welfare and institutional reform, and placed mechanisms that guaranteed merit-based employment and bureaucratic oversight of public services and social provisions. In 1955, the government issued a decree for the establishment of the Civil Service Board (CSB). The Central Inspection Board (CIB) was established in 1958 and was responsible for monitoring public administrations, institutions and municipalities, excluding the judiciary, army, and security forces except on financial matters. The CIB was also responsible for providing consultation to the authorities, coordination between different administrations, and conducting investigations and evaluations.

However, some argue that despite Chehab's political and familial struggle to denounce unearned entitlement associated with family influence, heritage and confession, he defied the traditional clientelist system by inaugurating a subtler clientelist system of patronage (Malsagne, 2011). Only this time, the patron-client relationship of allegiance ignored the criteria of confession and local political influence and rather operated according to different criteria, namely individual knowledge, competence and loyalty to the army. This conclusion suggests that at the peak of public administration, efficiency, power, and authority remained a factor of clique influence and deep divisions across socio-economic lines. Chehab himself commanded great loyalty, given both his lineage and command of the Army, and therefore much of his success in reforming the administration was due to his personage. For example, **because the CSB relied on the authority and support of the President rather than on its institutional capacities or prerogatives, its sustainability was likely to be seriously contested after Chehab ceased to be president.**

Although Chehab's successor Charles Helou maintained this system, Suleiman Franjieh's presidency brought about its dismantling when the cabinet forced 255 employees into retirement, suspended the immunity that protected civil servants, issued a mandate abolishing grant transfer to members of the CSB and CIB, rotated grade 1 employees, and issued a decree abolishing the requirement of a university degree for candidates to this position (El Zein, 2003). Franjieh, whose interests were negatively affected during the Chehab-Helou era, opposed their administrative school and criticized their bureaucratic reforms for allowing administrators a substantial role in decision-making and policy design (Kisirwani, 1997). Such powerful bureaucratic systems decreased politicians' abilities to secure public jobs for their supporters, as well as providing services for their constituencies, and thus the patron-client relationships in public administration of the pre-Chehabi era were reinstated, proving that administrative reform attempts are not always progressive.

The civil war (1975-1990) not only caused destruction of the physical infrastructure of the country, it also caused damage to the institutional structure as well, leading to many of the structural problems that the country suffers from today. The Taif agreement signed in 1989 succeeded in creating a ceasefire and an incomplete dissolution of war-time militias; however, it also reinstated the leaders of these militias in key political and administrative positions, thereby institutionalizing civil conflict through the sectarianization of public institutions (Hudson, 1999). The politicians therefore used modern state institutions to create political currency and to secure power shares by channeling social provisions to their constituencies, particularly through employment in the public sector, rendering it an instrument for equal distribution of provisions and services across sectarian constituencies, and a primary mechanism through which power arrangements are reproduced.

Gerald Caiden (1969) argues that administrative reform is power politics in action, meaning that it is an essentially political activity that attempts to change the power structure in society. Arguably, such attempts were made in Lebanon during and after the end of the civil war. The Taif Accord is regarded by many scholars as a constitutional remaking of the sectarian order by local, regional, and international actors, among whom many were directly involved in the conflict, whereby Lebanese politics is managed via corporate power-sharing arrangements negotiated and supervised by external powers, and thereby creating a structural dilemma wherein sectarian/political elites are recognized as custodians of the political order while also being expected to reform it.

The Taif Accord not only shifted executive powers from the President to the Council of Ministers, it also strengthened parliamentary oversight over the executive, which made it nearly impossible for the cabinet to dissolve the parliament, while the speaker may ignore bills sent to the Parliament by the Council of Ministers, and is under no obligation to convene Parliament outside regular sessions. The new distribution of power meant that public policy making relied on the agreement of the heads of the legislative and executive authorities, which act as the sole representatives of their sectarian communities' demands. In turn, this arrangement, coupled with the National Accord's principle of equitable distribution of all major public posts according to sect, generated a sectarian quota in public administration through clientelistic processes of recruitment and promotion, thereby institutionalizing a culture of clientelism and corporate power-sharing in the public sector.

Post-war response

In order **to circumvent bureaucratic oversight and the potential for political deadlock, administrative reform during and after the war was compromised in favor of newly established quasi-governmental institutions** to run the reconstruction-oriented development process. The government channeled substantial funds to these institutions, namely the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR), the Council of the South, the Central Fund for the Displaced (CFD), which were endowed with the public responsibility of planning public infrastructure and providing basic public services. Between the mid-1990s and mid-2000, these quasi-governmental institutions spent approximately US $10 billion collectively, US $7.4 billion of which was spent by the CDR in contracts with different sectors (Salloukh, Barakat, Al-Habbal, Khattab, & Mikaelian, 2015). The contracts were allocated to companies held by the Prime Minister, among which are Solidere, Sukleen, and Oger-Liban, and the CDR was engaged in all phases of project implementation, including planning and design, conducting feasibility studies, bidding, execution, operation and maintenance of public facilities, thereby marginalizing the role of the Parliament and the Ministry of Public Works among other public institutions. The circumvention of mechanisms of accountability through the CDR enabled politicians to benefit from the positions of their associates and relatives who were appointed to its executive and board. The practices of the CFD and the Council of the South were no less dubious, funneling millions of dollars from the government to fund clientelist practices and unsustainable projects (Ibid).

In 1994, the Office of the Minister of State for Administrative Reform (OMSAR) was established by former Prime Minister Hariri in response to the demands of foreign donors of the reconstruction project such as the European Union, the World Bank, and UN agencies, and to attract more loans and grants for administrative reform. Donors demanded administrative reform be implemented in parallel with reconstruction. The OMSAR's function was limited to producing paperwork of objectives and strategies, none of which have been implemented (El Zein, 2003). In addition, OMSAR is not a ministry in its own right, but does fall under the jurisdiction of the Council of Ministers. Its employees however are not exclusively public sector civil servants but rather a large number of its staff consist of UNDP and EU consultants[5]. Consequently, OMSAR is not a publicly funded institution, but rather funded by the UNDP, the EU, and the USAID. OMSAR also has no jurisdiction over any other public institution, nor are its recommendations binding. While administrative reform has been promoted by the international community as means for good governance, some scholars have argued that the models advocated by the donor community are in line with a belief in free market as a means towards development and stability (Harrison, 2001), and fail to address the structural needs and political contexts of developing nations. On OMSAR's website, it can be clearly seen that the Arabic name used for OMSAR (Maktab Wazir al-Dawlahl-shu'oun al-tanmiyah al-Edariyah) indicates a fundamentally different meaning. It literally translates into 'The Office of the Minister of State for Administrative Development' with clear elimination of the term reform. The Ministry appears to be communicating different missions to different targets using reform with international audiences and development to local audiences. The difference indicates tension in the function of this institution which splits between fulfilling international expectations for reformand national developmental goals.

While initiatives such as e-governance championed by OMSAR are more aligned with develapmental goals and would thereby garner more funding, providing developmental strategies as reform initiatives depoliticizes the structural issues that underlie some of the main weaknesses of public administration in Lebanon. **Needs hardly attractor determine public spending,** of which distribution is predominantly divided across sects with primacy over health, educational, and infrastructural needs (Salti & Chaaban, 2010). This is due to a combination of structural and operational failures as a consequence of sectarianism, namely administrative centralisation and the lack of transparency and accountability (Alberti & Sayed, 2007). The lack of access to information, and the lack of legislative and budget transparency as major factors in promoting corruption, and challenging reform in public institutions. To date, a total of 16 parliamentary committees with major authorities are immune from judiciary and public inquiry, and they enjoy full meeting confidentiality (Beyond Reform and Development, 2012). In addition, structural challenges in public institutions appear in a relatively high number of municipalities in relation to land and population size, meaning that many municipalities administer very small areas with very little tax return, and often with very weak organisational capacities and human resources (Atallah, 2016).

Although numerous projects have been conducted by the NGO community on issues related to reform, it is argued that NGOs and CSOs serve as strategic partners to both the political elite and international organisations (Salloukh, Barakat, Al-Habbal, Khattab, & Mikaelian, 2015). For example, despite the major gap between needs and public services, the UN gave Lebanon their Public Service Award in 2007 for streamlining all operations related to tax payment and collection. This strategic partnership means that NGOs fill the vacuum of a weak state by providing services and socio-economic needs resulting from state retrenchment, thereby freeing the government from

5. For more information, please visit:
 http://www.omsar.gov.lb/Cultures/en-US/AboutOMSAR/Structure/Pages/Structure.aspx (retrieved February 2016)

providing meaningful services to its constituencies (ibid). Since NGOs rely on donor funding, their operations are often shaped by the politics of international aid, which is premised on the promotion of the reform of, and accommodation to, the sectarian system, rather than its structural transformation, thereby legitimizing the sectarian system by the very actors who are supposed to challenge it (Ibid.). Between 1998 and 2000 the Lahoud-Hoss Cabinet launched an anti-corruption campaign which ended in the arrest of 19 directors and director generals. Later, PM Hoss confessed in a book in 2001 that not all the names of the directors were revealed by control agencies, but rather that the campaign was specifically directed against Hariri loyalists (El Zein, 2003). Public policy, in light of the post-2005 power struggle between 14 and 8 March, although popularized as divergent visions over Lebanon's identity and alliances, in reality hinges on the sectarian power struggle over who governs the post-Syrian Lebanese State (Salloukh, Barakat, Al-Habbal, Khattab, & Mikaelian, 2015). **In short, rather than looking at administrative reform as a mere managerial process aiming for incremental development in Lebanon, it must be regarded as a political process, since reform is a product of political opportunity more than it is a product of management.**

To sum up, since its establishment under Ottoman rule, public administration in Lebanon was facilitated by systems of patronage and political/sectarian struggles for representation. The establishment of a centralized administration came at the cost of public service being seen less as a duty and more as a means to gain influence and control, political loyalty becoming more important than administrative capabilities, and the normalization of political intervention in administrative affairs. **With time, these elements became customary attributes of public administration deeply rooted in an organisational culture which continues to be burdensome until today.** Despite the contributions made by the French to develop modern state and administrative institutions in Lebanon, politicians continued to appoint their supporters in the administration, relying on the Lebanese Constitution's stipulation of the fair representation of sects in public offices and Cabinet. **Decentralization in this context meant political/sectarian quotas in public institutions.**

The subsequent reforms and establishment of **new institutions post-independence proved unsustainable, primarily because they heavily relied on the authority and support of the President rather than their capacities and prerogatives.** The extent to which the distribution of public services relied on politics rather than administration played a major role in the eventual breakdown of the system during the civil war. Bolstered by the Taif Accord, public administration was redistributed across political/sectarian lines according to the newly established power dynamics in the country, leading to the institutionalization of political sectarianism. In addition, donor agendas providing developmental strategies as reform initiatives depoliticized to a large extent the structural issues that underlie some of the main weaknesses of public administration in Lebanon.

Chapter Three: Research Methodology

The research questions are investigated by conducting a literature review on administrative reform in Lebanon, as well as political parties' engagement with these attempts. Individual interviews were conducted with nine Lebanese political parties to gather qualitative data on their involvement in administrative reform, as well as data pertaining to the internal administration of these parties. To understand power and hierarchy in bureaucracy, it is important to examine the power relations and the nature of authority not just in public institutions, but also in different social organisations such as political parties, family, as well as self-control and discipline at a more micro-level. Of these social organisations, this study focuses on the internal organisation and hierarchy of political parties in Lebanon in an attempt to examine parallels in the nature of power/authority at the level of state as well as political parties. **Political parties' commitment to reform within the state has been questioned further by the lack of reform inside these parties.** Content analysis of political parties' programs and agendas for reform was conducted to gather supplementary information on their strategies. The study also presents a background on the political history of public administration in Lebanon, highlighting the main political developments that played an instrumental role in shaping public administration in Lebanon.

Research Methods

1- **Literature Review**: A review of literature on administrative reform in Lebanon and political parties' engagement with these attempts was carried out, including academic publications, NGO reports, and government reports.

2- **Individual interviews:** One to one interviews with senior members of political parties was carried out. These interviews examined political parties' approaches to reform in general, as well as their responses to administrative reform. Interviews were carried out with members of selected political parties responsible for developing party reform strategies and agendas.

3- **Content Analysis:** A review of political parties' programs regarding management and reform within the party was carried out, as well as a review of their reform strategies at the state level, in addition to a mapping of specific reforms emphasized by political parties.

Sample and Selection Strategy

Nine political parties were selected for this study, eight of which were serving in the government or parliament during the course of the fieldwork, with the exception of DRM. Interview participants were selected through convenient sampling. Each selected party recommended 1-2 representatives with relevant knowledge of the administrative practices within the party, as well as the position and strategies each party has towards administrative reform at the state level. The parties were also requested to provide access to materials such as programs and agendas relevant to both internal and external administrative strategies. Among the political parties selected to participate in this study are Amal Movement, Democratic Renewal Movement (DRM), Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), Future Movement (FM), Hezbollah, Al-jama'ah al-islamiyah, Kataeb, Lebanese Forces (LF), Progressive Socialist Party (PSP). The political parties selected, their position in the government, number of participants interviewed and the positions they occupy, and the type of materials provided are detailed in Table 1 below:

Political Party	Position in Government	Interview Participant 1	Interview Participant 2	Access to Materials
Amal Movement	Yes	Senior Member	NA	NA
Democratic Renewal Movement	Former Government	Executive Committee Member/Founder	NA	Needs assessment for internal recruitment, conference reports, public statements
Free Patriotic Movement	Yes	Senior Member	NA	Public statements, strategies and internal bylaws
Future Movement	Yes	Former Minister	Consultant of Minister	Online published reports, public statements
Hezbollah	Yes	Consultant of Minister	Research Consultant	OMSAR Report and Research Documents
Islamic Group	Yes	Former MP	NA	Strategy for 2010 & 2016
Kataeb	Yes	Member Responsible for Internal Admin	Member Responsible for External Admin	Internal documents and strategies
Lebanese Forces	Yes	Senior Consultant	Senior Member	Public statements, published agenda, internal bylaws
Progressive Socialist Party	Yes	Senior Member	NA	Online published reports, public statements

Data Analysis

A qualitative analysis of the data was conducted based on the interview questionnaires, which address the strategies, experiences, and challenges faced by the selected political parties when engaging in issues on reform. The parties' state-level reform strategies are also analyzed in comparison to the internal administration of each party. The purpose of this comparison is to measure the extent to which the internal administrative dynamics of the party reflects its performance when engaging in state-level administrative reform. In order to do so, mechanisms of internal evaluation and needs assessment were analyzed.

Limitations

One of the limitations of this study is the scarcity of resources on political parties' administrative reform strategies as well as resources describing their internal organisations. Access to resources on Hezbollah's internal administrative structure was denied due to security reasons, that of DRM was considered private and for use only internally, and that of Amal, PSP, Future Movementwere unavailable. Therefore, only estimated conclusions could be made as to the extent to which their internal administrative structure reflects their state-level administrative policies and practices, or based on their interviews.

Another limitation is that due to the disparity in the types of materials provided by political parties, it was not possible to conduct a comparative content analysis on their strategies and agendas for reform. Only Al-jama'ah al-islamiyah offered to share their strategies, however, nearly none of the materials offered by any of the parties were readily available for public use. The strategies of other parties were collected through grey literature and online publications from political parties' website including Amal, Kataeb, LF, FM, Hezbollah, FPM, and DRM. The only exceptions were research documents, received from the Director of the Consultative Center for Studies and Documentation, of studies which had been commissioned by Hezbollah. Furthermore, the information provided by the different party representatives are limited to their personal knowledge of the issue and are not necessarily exhaustive accounts of each party's strategies and practices. In addition, the lack of documents, publication, written strategies, and agendas, and the secrecy was a major limitation to the study.

Chapter Four: Political Parties' Approaches to Administrative Reform

This chapter presents political parties' approaches for administrative reform in Lebanon. The majority of political parties interviewed identified key administrative reform objectives, including decentralization, privatization, e-governance. These administrative approaches discussed and promoted by political parties are presented by themes in this chapter.

Although all political parties interviewed in this study considered administrative reform essential, none of them had a readily available strategy or a publication explicitly developed and solely dedicated to administrative reform. Nevertheless, they had different and sometimes common administrative reform priorities which were reflected in their published reports, public statements, as well as during the interviews.

Decentralization

LF, FM, FPM, Kataeb, DRM, and Al-jama'ah promoted the idea of decentralisation by moving essential administrative and financial prerogatives to locally-elected decentralised administrative units. While LF, FM, and FPM saw decentralisation as a means to improve local development, Kataeb and Al-jama'ah saw it as an opportunity to achieve a higher level of administrative accountability and equal development by freeing administrative decision-making from the influence of the Council of Ministers as well as its Secretary General and will circumvent the need for sectarian quotas on administrative posts.

In a joint statement in June 2015[6], the Lebanese Forces and the Free Patriotic Movement declared a series of common objectives which mainly focused on broad issues including national security and sovereignty and offered a marginal attention on the need to strengthen state institutions and to promote a legal culture. Specific to administrative reform, both parties proclaimed their support for the administrative and financial decentralisation as designated in 1989 *in Wathiqat al-Wefaq al-Watani* (the National Reconciliation Pact), also known as the Taif Agreement. They particularly focused on the idea of **moving essential administrative and financial prerogatives to decentralised elected authorities,** and to enable each of these decentralised units to generate its own revenues. The LF viewed the existing administrative structure, having been established in the 1960s, as an essentially vertical structure, and argued that all changes or reforms made to this structure have also been vertical in manner, meaning there is no capacity for cooperation between different administrations and ministries. Today, with the progress being made in governance and the changes in environment and technology, public and administrative structures can no longer be managed without horizontal organisation, the LF argued. Given this vertical structure upon which public administration in Lebanon is based, there is a need to consider these changes and try to create horizontal links between groups linked vertically to their ministries. The FPM also stated that they support administrative decentralization, as well as financial decentralization, as a means for transferring responsibilities to municipalities and in order to promote local development.

Kataeb have a similar stance on administrative decentralization, and also perceived public

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6. The statement is available in the following article: Annahar (2015)
   https://www.annahar.com/article/241714-هذه-هي-بنود-اعلان-النوايا-بين-القوات-والتيار) (retrieved February 2016).

administration in Lebanon as heavily centralized. Kataeb emphasised the need for administrative as well as financial decentralisation at the level of regional administrative units, which could be realised through an elected local council and controlled through a newly established independent system of control and inspection. Kataeb added that these units need to enjoy greater autonomy in decision-making and spending including the identification and collection of local taxes. They stated that all appointments and decisions in any part of Lebanon no matter how small need to pass through the Council of Minister's agenda. Kataeb argued that the real decision-making authority belongs to the Secretary General of the Council of Ministers, not the Cabinet as a whole. They added that there is a network activated between some political powers and the Council of Ministers, and this network decides what the state's priorities are and sets the agenda. To deal with this, the party was preparing a draft law that addressed the expansion of administrative decentralization, which they argued will also facilitate accountability and circumvent the need to create projects that prioritize sectarian distribution over specific needs. However, they claimed that their proposal of this draft is dependent on the extent to which they feel that the Parliament is working seriously on the issue. **Decentralization is meant to minimize centralized administration, which is, according to Kataeb, under the influence of the Council of Ministers.**

Al-jama'ah also promoted administrative decentralization as a means to facilitate accountability. According to Al-jama'ah, when local affairs are administered by an elected local body, through the Municipal Council or otherwise, these people can be held accountable by those who elected them. Their objective is to provide citizens with the space they need to hold their representatives accountable. They also argued that centralized decision-making facilitates unequal development - particularly in instances when particular ministers are biased towards their regions. Decentralization means that each region can develop itself independently as per a shared centralized mechanism, based on which a plan is created, and through which responsibilities are distributed, which ultimately leads to more equal development across regions. They claim that in the absence of administrative decentralization, all peripheries are disadvantaged, since most of the universities are in the capital or large cities, and students are forced to move in order to study - public transactions are also centralized in the cities, and villagers need to travel in order to renew an ID or otherwise. Decentralization means that these transactions are distributed regionally, which will reduce the number of bureaucratic procedures one must go through.

According to the FM, the recommendation for decentralization was stipulated since the Taif agreement, and is a necessity to advance administrative reform in Lebanon. However, they considered that some political parties' views on decentralization are unacceptable since they equate it with federation. The FM claim that they fully support the draft law on decentralization despite that some loopholes need to be discussed and revised such as the issue of whether or not presidents of municipalities should be elected directly by the people. They stated that they've often experienced deadlocks within municipalities because of lack of consensus among members of its council.

DRM launched a conference on administrative decentralisation in 2014[7]. During this conference, former Minister of Interior Ziad Baroud stated that the committee of experts in which he participated produced an acceptable draft project for decentralisation according to the principles of the National Reconciliation Pact. However, the process of discussing and approving the project is now a political issue, Baroud continues. Former Minister Khaled Kabbani stated that successful administrative

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7. For more information on the conference, please see NewLebanon (2014).
   http://www.newlebanon.info/lebanon-now/127345/ندوة-في-حركة-التجدد-الديمقراطي-حول-اللامركزية إشكالية-المقاربة-وتحديات-التطبيق- (retrieved February 2016).

decentralisation encompasses coherence between all three dimensions, the organisation, political, and economical. He described that successful reform necessitates the establishment of locally-elected local administrative units that enjoy full autonomy, while the central authority retains its right to control and inspect the work of these units in the interest of the public. He added that this organisational structure needs to be coupled with an extended state authority across the country and distributive justice. He highlighted that the positive features of the proposed draft law include the amalgamation between a degree of centralised control and decentralised administration, the clear determination of the framework and the scope of administrative decentralisation at the level of municipalities and districts, the abolition of municipality unions, and allowing equal participation in public life for non-registered residents (living in the district for more than 6 years) by electing their representatives. However, Kabbani also mentioned a few problems in the draft law including confusion of legislative and executive authorities between the district council and the general commission, as well as between the president of the district council and the president of the administrative council.

Privatization and Private Sector Partnerships

Views differed between opponents and proponents of unrestrained privatisation as well as promoters of a more conservative and regulated privatisation. While FM focused in its statements on shrinking the size of public administration as well as reducing the cost of public administration through contractual employment and privatisation, Hezbollah equated privatisation with selling off private property and promoted its abolishment. Kataeb, LF, and DRM saw privatization as complementary to decentralization. These parties acknowledge the essential role of government as regulator, but argued that governments in general often fail at administration and management of public sectors, and that private sector partnerships can reintroduce merit into public administration, and improve operations through competition. Therefore, they claim that privatization of daily operational services can relieve the government of the weight of administration. The DRM distinguishably did not take an ideological stance and rather seemed to be highly conservative and critical of privatisation despite supporting it as a means to address only what public administration is incapable of controlling (e.g. quality of service). This view further contrasts to Hezbollah's rejection of privatization as a means for administrative reform.

The LF finds it necessary to integrate the private sector into the public sector in order to benefit from their experience. There is a huge gap between the capacity of the private sector in comparison to the public sector, and all important stocks belong to the government, so the LF argued that a positive reform can be to open up stocks for public investment, creating cooperation between investors and the government, which allows more monitoring and regulation. To do so, huge sectors such as electricity and water and petroleum need to be opened to public investment. They cited the example of Saudi Arabia's telecom industry that was introduced to the stock market in 2002. Allowing citizens direct ownership through the purchase of stocks boosts the economy by bringing in foreign funds into the Lebanese stock exchange. The LF also stressed the importance of research and development for policy-making, which is nearly absent in Lebanon. They argued that even the private sector is led by private initiatives and incentives to invest, rather than research and development. However, such initiatives require extensive capital, which will likely cost more than it can return for the time being. LF claims that those benefitting from lack of reform object to proposals at every stage. They cited the example of law No. 462 that was passed in 2002 to privatize the electricity sector, which the government still hasn't implemented. They added, while ministers claimed they have every intention of implementing the law, they also claimed that the Parliament or the Cabinet is obstructing them, and every minister accuses other ministers of creating obstructions in order to withdraw his responsibility to implement the law.

When inquired on the issue of privatization, the FM clarified that they supported a liberal

unregulated market. However, they argued that some economic privileges such as the limited agencies on imported commodities stand in the way of equal economic participation. They argued that, thanks to the French mandate, Lebanese Catholics had long enjoyed the privilege to own the agencies of certain European commodities. They added that with time all large licenses were monopolized which rendered competition over new enterprises meaningless. They claimed that Rafiq Hariri tried to dissolve these monopolies but he was faced by resistance from the Maronite Patriarchy and Motraniyet el Roum in Beirut accusing him of threatening the interests of the Christian people. **Finally, FM claim that Hariri was keen for privatization as a way to liberate failing sectors and particularly when privatization was set as a condition by the Paris II conference.** The FM's priorities for administrative reform were reflected in a report[8] on political and institutional reform published on PM Fouad Siniora's webpage which described the objectives as well as the achievement of Siniora's term as PM for two consecutive governments between 2005 and 2009. It stated that the PM's objectives entailed an all-embracing plan that included political, security, institutional, and economic reforms. At the level of privatisation, it stated the objective to develop a "draft law pushing for organised privatisation of state-administered functions and projects". The report states the draft law was either not studied or discarded by the parliament as a result of political deadlock.

Hezbollah had a largely different approach and priorities for institutional reform described in a report by Abdel Halim Fadlallah titled "Almas'ala Al-Ejtima'eya E'nd Hezbullah - Alkhoutab w Al-Moumarasah"[9]. Hezbollah emphasises the need to abolish sectarian politics and to establish a new modern government that ensures the rule of law, accountability, recognises the affinity between political and social reform which includes "integral human development, a just taxation, subsidization of productive sector, reduction of unemployment, enforcement of social protection, entitlement of all citizens to the NSSF, abolishment of privatization and selling of public property".(ibid).

In its published objectives[10], DRM focuses on the need to confront abuse of power and influence as well as political quotas in public administration by strengthening the role of control agencies in public administration. DRM promotes the reconsideration of the size and efficiency of public administration, as well as the privatisation of public functions. However, DRM was the only party that emphasised the idea that new mechanisms should be instated to prevent both public and private sector monopolies. This view was clearly pointed out by the former president and founder of DRM Nassib Lahoud in a conference titled *"Almarafeq Alaamah w Alkhaskhasah: Ay Khayarat Lelobnan"* (Public Facilities and Privatisation: What Options Does Lebanon Have?) in March 2002. Lahoud emphasised the idea of conditional privatisation that should only be in favour of a better and cheaper service for citizens, and not in favour of private monopoly and interests. He demanded the government in 2000 to prevent any of its members to take part in possessing or managing privatised public properties. The DRM argued that it is necessary to learn from the failed privatization attempts of the past. For example, they claim that the petroleum sector was privatized because it was a profit-making sector, and privatization allowed political/sectarian elites to profit from its investment. "Although these politicians were liberal when it came to privatizing the petroleum sector, when it came to electricity, they became socialists, and stood up to protect the public sector", DRM argued

8. Siniora, Fouad (2009). "Political and Institutional Reform Trends and Achievements During the Governments of PM Fouad Siniora 2005-2009" (Arabic). Retrieved August 2016 from http://www.fuadsiniora.com/sites/default/files/publications/img4db00dd156539.pdf
9. Fadlallah, Abdel Halim (2009). Almas'ala Al-Ejtima'eya E'nd Hezbullah - Alkhoutab w Al-Moumarasah. The Consultative Centre for Studies and Documentation, Beirut 2009.
10. DRM's objectives are available on their webpage: http://www.tajaddod.org/index.php?id=9 (retrieved February 2016)

during the interview. The DRM claim that this position was motivated by the fact that the electricity sector was unlikely to produce any financial profit, but was a viable public sector to facilitate the employment of their constituencies in order to guarantee their loyalty.

E- Governance

All political parties agreed that public administration is in dire need for reform. However, none of the political parties interviewed in this study presented any concrete strategies dedicated exclusively to administrative reform within the state. They rather engaged with administrative reform at the level of specific campaigns, recommendations, draft laws, as well as reform-related committees.

According to the LF, public administration should not be a heavy bureaucracy that focuses more on procedure than service. They argued that administration must be result-oriented, and if procedures are not effective then they must be changed. They see that reform should be based on the principle of service with maximum efficiency - making service effectiveness the priority. **E-governance, they argued, allows the public sector to become service-oriented rather than process-oriented.** E-governance also reduces the size of public administration, in addition to reducing interaction between citizens and the public servants, thereby tackling bribery and corruption as well. It also reduces cost both for the government and the citizen. The LF argue that strategically, what the government is lacking is a law on e-services and procedures that facilitate interaction between different public administrations. A law does exist, however, it only addresses e-contracts, which are commercial than administrative services. Therefore, the LF have contributed to drafting a complementary law, drawing from lessons from other countries such as Germany, Estonia, Malaysia, and Dubai, with aid of local and international experts and specialists.

The LF noted however that they did not draft the law to be too detailed and thus too technical, but rather drafted the law as a legal framework, which would make it more likely for the law to be approved by the Parliament, after which decrees would be passed detailing any essential technicalities. After discussions with the experts and the stakeholders in the LF, a conference was held that included Lebanese experts, both technical and legal, to launch a dialogue on the draft law. LF claimed that e-governance then became more public, which opened new doors to continue working to improve the law, and also to facilitate any business that might be helpful to the law once drafted. They had workshops with experts and the Lebanese Bar, as well as the parliament research department which has studied the amendments to other laws necessary in order to facilitate this one. They also cooperated with the ministries and the private sector for their expertise. The LF claimed that the committee was receptive, and that if the situation had been better between the members of Parliament, this draft law would have passed and been implemented. They claimed that government is very positive about it - especially since it's a legal framework that doesn't obligate any party to certain strict rules - it's very broad and flexible - and the LF generally advocated that all laws should be as broad and flexible as possible. The LF argued that such an approach would be ineffective when it comes to technology, since by the time a law is drafted, the technology would have changed. Therefore, a flexible framework is needed, alongside decrees drafted by ministers concerned, which is why cooperation between ministries is also necessary. According to the LF, the Council of Ministers, OMSAR, the prime minister and the ministries all have a major role to play in this reform.

The LF were not alone in advocating e-governance. The findings reveal that several other parties are invested in e-governance, including Al-jama'ah, consecutive Ministers at OMSAR, MPs from the IT Committee (mostly from Future Movement), Nadim Gemayel from Kataeb, in addition to MP Joseph Maalouf from the LF. In contrast to political parties' (i.e. LF and FM) advancement of

e-governance and decentralisation as a means to combat corruption, Kataeb, Hezbollah, and Al-jama'ah stated that they were putting legislative and advocacy efforts to target corruption. E-governance is also one of the main components of Minister Fneish's 2011 Strategy for Administrative Reform. The strategy involved a plan for the incremental implementation of e-governance in Lebanon. The first component of the plan has been implemented, and has led to the establishment of an online portal (www.dawlati.gov.lb) that allows access to personal information or documents pertaining to public services. Another component alongside the portal is inter-operability, which facilitates the sharing of information between ministries, as well as scientific re-engineering and simplification of procedures. In response to the e-governance draft law proposed by the LF, Hezbollah was positive about the mutual interest, but questioned whether these efforts were misplaced, and whether they are effective at all. They regard the idea of a draft law for e-governance as the wrong approach to deal with a common strategy. They believe that all parties have the freedom, right, and duty to propose any strategy or objective they have - but believe that whether these proposals are effective or useful for the country is the main question. They maintain that their strategies are national, participatory, and do not represent one sect or interest. Despite common objectives, political parties still expressed divergent perspectives when it came to executive strategies.

A number of draft laws were initiated by OMSAR and other MPs such as the Right to Access Information law supported by MP and reformist Ghassan Mkhaiber, and the Conflict of Interest law initiated by OMSAR. Examples of other initiatives include the law to establish the National Anti-Corruption Committee, the amendment of the Illicit Enrichment law and Public Procurement law, and the Whistle blowers' Protection law. Again, despite the unanimity against corruption, each political party appears to be approaching the matter differently.

To conclude the major political parties' approaches on administrative reform, LF, FM, FPM, Kataeb, DRM and Al-jama'ah promoted the idea of decentralisation by moving essential administrative and financial prerogatives to locally-elected decentralised administrative units. While LF, FM, and FPM saw decentralisation as a means to improve local development, Kataeb and Al-jama'ah saw it as an opportunity to achieve a higher level of administrative accountability and equal development by freeing administrative decision-making from the influence of the Council of Ministers as well as its Secretary General and will circumvent the need for sectarian quotas on administrative posts.

However, views differed between opponents and proponents of unrestrained privatisation as well as promoters of a more conservative and regulated privatisation.While FM focused in its statements on shrinking the size of public administration as well as reducing the cost of public administration through contractual employment and privatisation, Hezbollah equated privatisation with selling off private property and promoted its abolishment. Kataeb, LF, and DRM saw privatization as complementary to decentralization. These parties acknowledge the essential role of government as regulator, but argued that governments in general often fail at administration and management of public sectors, and that private sector partnerships can reintroduce merit into public administration, and improve operations through competition. Therefore, they claim that privatization of daily operational services can relieve the government of the weight of administration. Privatization also reduces the number of civil servants and thereby reduces bribery and corruption rates, as well as addresses the issue of sectarian recruitment practices in the public sector. They argued that private-sector partnerships facilitate the abolishment of the feudal state, which has limited productivity and incurred high cost. However, if the state is limited to monitoring and regulation, the public sector becomes easier to reform, and cooperation between administrations becomes easier.

The DRM had a more conservative stance on privatization and their views differ slightly from the LF, FM, and Kataeb in that they advocate specifically un-monopolized and regulated privatization, but distinguishably did not take an ideological stance for it. They rather perceive privatization as exceptional means through which some of the administrative failures in the public sector can be addressed. The DRM argued that it is necessary to learn from the failed privatization attempts of the past. FM's promotion of unrestricted revenue-centred privatization is in stark contrast to the DRM conservative support of regulated privatization and service efficiency in favour of the citizen, which further contrasts to Hezbollah's rejection of privatization as a means for administrative reform.

Chapter Five: Administrative Reform Challenges

All political parties interviewed identified key institutional/structural and political challenges that create barriers to administrative reform. They identified the key institutional challenges that pertain to control agencies and quasi-governmental institutions, and key political challenges as the lack of political consensus and the role that sectarian politics plays in public administration. This chapter presents these structural challenges which pertain to the roles and jurisdictions of control agencies and quasi-governmental institutions.

As illustrated in the background section above, control agencies were created during the establishment and evolution of Lebanese public administration, and were meant to facilitate certain aspects of public administration such as recruitment (CSB), public procurement (CIB), and creating mechanisms of accountability (Court of Accounts). Several aspects, including the historical organisational culture of clientelism and the political/sectarian power-sharing component of the Lebanese political system, contributed to the eventual breakdown and current dysfunctional state of these control agencies today.

Control Agencies

A consensus can be found among the majority of political parties that control agencies, particularly the CSB, are mostly dysfunctional, infiltrated with clientalism and political influence, and are in need for reform. However, the parties still seem to differ in terms of the jurisdictions they expect of these agencies. While Hezbollah argued that CSB's independence is integral, but that its jurisdiction should not extend to the Cabinet, Kataeb argued that it is particularly problematic that the CSB's subservience and dependence on the Cabinet. Kataeb made a specific effort to assert the need to free control agencies from the grip of the Cabinet, particularly when it comes to public procurement. Whereas, FM proposed in one of its reports to further reduce the functions of control agencies by assigning public procurement to a new independent administration in favour of competition, equality between bidders, and transparent subcontracting. Finally, Al-jama'ah has a more reformative stance and made efforts to promote improving the functions of control agencies by building their capacities to manage human resources in public administration and improving their role in enforcing accountability mechanisms.

Nearly all political parties interviewed saw that the state's control agencies are in need of reform, since none of these agencies are regarded as independent bodies. However, the parties still seem to differ in terms of the jurisdictions they expect of these agencies. For example, Hezbollah stated that the CSB itself lacks proper recruitment mechanism and argued that the CSB's administration is politicized, given that the president of the CSB is appointed by the Cabinet, but also claimed that the CSB is not qualified to make employment decisions in cases where Ministries are more informed about their needs. Therefore, Hezbollah argued that the CSB's independence is integral, but that its jurisdiction should not extend to the Cabinet. On the other hand, Kataeb argued that it is particularly problematic that the Cabinet does not respect or abide by the recommendations of the CSB, since their recommendations are non-binding. The party argued that building an administration that is independent from the Cabinet facilitates the establishment of an organisational structure built on meritocracy.

Kataeb contended that the CSB has become "biased towards hiring unqualified personnel" due to clientelism, and accused the CSB of deliberately reducing the standard of public sector

employment, for example, by holding finance examinations in Arabic. They argued that the CSB should instead be limited to hiring graduates of National School of Administration (ENA) - the administrative model adopted from France - which is a management institute through which employees must pass in order to be employed in the public sector. Kataeb claimed that the Lebanese government is held hostage by the Council of Ministers, which decides the number of employees it will accept, and has the authority to cancel the examinations if it doesn't suit them. They argued that reclaiming the role of the ENA in training and recruitment of civil servants is an effective means through which public administration can be taken out of the hands of political parties.

According to Kataeb, public procurement is largely influenced by the functions of control agencies such as the Court of Accounts and the CIB. Since these agencies are subsidiaries of the government, their involvement in the procurement process creates a conflict of interest, particularly since the head of the Cabinet also controls the CIB. Since these control agencies are meant to be independent, Kataeb are now studying a draft law to make the CIB and Court of Accounts independent judiciary bodies. There are several proposals for control agencies to be transferred to the jurisdiction of the Higher Judiciary Council - given that it is also independent - so that it is able to hold the executive accountable. Some proposals advocate that control agencies be under the jurisdiction of the President, while others suggest that the Parliament should elect these agencies as the Constitutional Council proposed. Despite the fact that there are several proposals under study, the common principle is that control agencies must not be under the jurisdiction of the executive authorities.

FM's approach to reform the process of public tenders did not seem to reinvest in existing institutions such as control agencies. It was reflected in Siniora's (2009) report which stated that one of its objectives was the modernisation of the law governing public tenders by establishing an independent administration to manage public tenders and deals based on competition, equality between bidders, and transparent subcontracting.

Al-jama'ah al-islamiyah on the other hand is part of the Parliamentary Committee for Administration and Justice, which is currently investigating the roles of four control agencies: the CSB, the CIB, the Court of Accounts, and the Council of State. They believe that amending these mechanisms, in coordination with concerned parties, would improve on the state of public Human Resources. If the capacities of the CSB are increased, and strict limits on violations are enforced, accompanied by a widening of its jurisdictions and protection against the encroachments of political authorities, the mechanism through which employees are recruited and managed will be improved. This is all currently under discussion in the Committee of Administration and Justice which has requested the CSB to provide its vision for how its performance can be improved.

Quasi-governmental Institutions

Several political parties such as DRM LF, and Kataebreferred to the excessive jurisdictions of quasi-governmental institutions such as the CDR, Council of the South, and several other Parliamentary Committees as particularly problematic. FPM claimed that the party is against the functions of quasi-governmental institutions, however, admitted that it has not yet taken any measures to deal with this or any other reforms in areas where they see reform as necessary. Whereas, Al-jama'ah and FM argued that the problem lies not in the existence of institutions such as the CDR but rather in its practices, given that its Board of Directors is not appointed or elected based on qualification, but rather based on clientalism, and that decisions are taken based on each political parties' interests in order to maintain its constituencies. Therefore, FM argued that reforming or dismantling any of the quasi-governmental institutions necessitates reforming all of them.

These institutions were created to be temporary but have become permanent fixtures of Lebanese public administration while remaining outside the jurisdiction of most control agencies, which also contributes to the marginalization of these control agencies' roles. Established under the banner of reform or reconstruction, with the aim to address the government's need for an accelerated approach, the CDR continues to usurp many of the responsibilities otherwise assigned to public institutions. Although these institutions were meant to be faster and more effective, with time, they became as bureaucratic as traditional institutions and even function in the same way or worse, given that they have more autonomy and may therefore function without being subject to the same auditory or regulatory mechanisms.

Kataeb claimed that they have been combating corruption by addressing public tenders. Through their two years of work in the Cabinet, Kataeb uncovered evidence of corruption and illicit enrichment through public procurements, with 30-40% profit made by politicians through public-private partnerships, thereby exhausting the state budget and economy. Kataeb claimed during the interview that around 20% of government procurement is facilitated by the CIB's Bidding Department, while 80% is done through political settlements and mock bidding committees. They emphasised that their "strategy was clear - anything over 100 million liras must be transferred to the Bidding Department". They added that the CIB has been increasingly marginalized since 1992, and currently only has five employees and two computers - while most of its responsibilities are usurped by the CDR, which is arguably neither transparent nor credible, and must also be subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of Accounts and CIB. Although Kataeb has faced and continues to face resistance against this strategy, they insist that the procurement process needs to be transparent and open to the public.

Another example presented by the LF of a quasi-governmental institution usurping public sector responsibilities is the Temporary Committee for the Investment and Management of the Port of Beirut, which was established in 1990. At the time, the port was under the administration of a private company, which had created a temporary transitional committee under the tutelage of the Ministry of Public Works - with its own private bank account and unlimited, uncontrolled authority. Despite the fact that the Committee was formed by the Minister of Public Works by order of the Cabinet, the Committee is neither a public nor private institution. The last time its members were formed was in 2001, and it is still operative today. The LF argued that the reason the committee was created was because, by having and independent administration, members of the committee could make a higher profit from the activity of the port - how this profit brings a return to the Lebanese economy however is yet unanswered. In response, the LF reported to have drafted a recommendation to the Cabinet requesting it to dismantle this committee and create a comprehensive maritime plan clarifying the roles of different ports - whether they are managed privately or through the Ministry - and also to create an organisational committee to work on strategy and investment in the ports.

The FM argued that reforming or dismantlingany of the quasi-governmental institutions necessitate reforming all of them including the CDR, Council of the South, and the Fund for the Displaced, as most of these institutions have a sectarian majority. Therefore, they concluded that there is no leeway to get out of this problem since political parties were not interested in reforming these institutions because it served their interests. They argue that most ministers introduced projects to serve their own villages or sphere of influence, and that most public tenders organized by quasi-governmental institutions were won by close relatives and acquaintances of politicians and public officials.

Al-jama'ah pointed out that the problem with quasi-governmental institutions isn't necessarily structural (i.e. overlapping with other agencies' or ministries jurisdictions), but it is rather functional pertaining to the process of appointing its staff based on sectarian or political affiliation. Al-jama'ah clarified that the CDR is subject to post-audit but not pre-audit. The difference is that although both audits are conducted by the Court of Accounts - pre-audit is concerned with the legality of the documents, while post audit is concerned with execution and whether conditions were followed. Al-jama'ah argued that the problem lies not in the existence of the CDR but rather in its practices, given that its Board of Directors is not appointed or elected based on qualification, but rather based on clientalism, and that decisions are taken based on each political parties' interests in order to maintain its constituencies, meaning that effectiveness in this case is not the priority.

Institutional Dis-continuity

Several parties including the FM, Hezbollah, Kataeb, Al-jama'ah, and DRM cited institutional discontinuity as a contributing challenge to administrative reform, given that ministers are under no obligation to uphold the reforms of their predecessors. This means that public institutions are not able to benefit from their legacy and accumulated experience and to measure up to their prerogatives and responsibilities, and remain subservient to the individuals that govern them. Some of the political parties interviewed admit that few ministers are willing to give their predecessors credit, and that their interests often conflict. Although public institutions are meant to project a degree of authority over the individuals that occupy them, the supremacy of individual political authority over public institutions suggests that institutional continuity might come at the cost of political/sectarian discontinuity. They all described many cases where, upon his/her election, the minister begins work from scratch. For example, a minister who differs in opinion from his predecessor may completely disregard his strategy and come up with a completely new one. The administration is no longer an objective bloc that treats all citizens equally, but rather an administration that reflects the politics of the minister in charge.

Concentrated capital coupled with sectarian influence was also mentioned during the interviews as potential for supremacy over institutional authority as well as for contesting Zoaama's power. The FM argued that the authority of capitalists or influential politicians sometimes superseded the authority of institutions as well as public officials including the PM. FM explains that between 1997 and 1998, former PM Rafiq al-Hariri tried to build an overpass from Nahr al-Kaleb to Maameltein after he secured donation funding. They added that the man monopolising most of Jouniyeh's roadwork bids who is also a major donator for the Maronite Patriarchy objected the project and "rumoured that Hariri wanted to deface Jouniyeh by building the overpass as a snub to Christians". **FM provided several similar examples of vigilante and capitalist supremacy over institutional processes by influential political leaders.** The FM claimed during the interview to have learned that despite their support for the free liberal market "the liberal market in Lebanon is a failed vision", because the supremacy of sectarian mobilisation and monopoly overpowers the state rule, which undermines the State's ability to ensure equal economic opportunity and participation.

Power-sharing

All parties interviewed saw recruitment and management of public sector civil servants as a particularly pertinent issue in need of reform. **However, the majority emphasized that this major challenge to administrative reform can be overcome only though political reform which they perceived as unrealistic and threatening for national security.** Each party had a particular angle from which they approached the issue. The primary lens through which political parties view public administration is though recruitment and management of civil service as well as sectarian quotas.

Hezbollah argued that political sectarianism is a primary challenge to reform, yet claimed that realistically, the divisions of the Lebanese system cannot be overcome. **The best that can be achieved in light of the current system is a merit-based sectarian system. Sects should offer the best they have to fill public positions,** not just people who are politically affiliated, which they believe is an achievable and marketable goal. Kataeb asserted that, should administrative reform not be accompanied by political and judicial reforms, merit-based system is the only solution despite its insufficiency. FM considered that this system poses a threat of certain parties dominating other parties with less qualified candidates, which will upset the sectarian balance of power.

Hezbollah discussed a particular project initiated by OMSAR under former Minister Mhammad Fneish (2011) from Hezbollah, and focused on public sector human resources management, with specific goals that aim to strengthen HRM at the level of Lebanese administration, and includes the modernization of Human Resources Units. This project included a proposal for the amendment of personnel laws, and the integration of technology and e-learning. These HR units are relatively new and work in coordination with the CSB. They stated that a draft law that addresses this issue is under study before the Council of Ministers and the Parliament.

Hezbollah asserted that **national goals are more important than disputes over employment distribution,** and although Hezbollah have very few positions in public administration, they see their relationship with their alliances as more important than disputes over other matters such as recruitment or employment distribution. Although they recognize that prioritizing alliances over reform does not lead to the merit-based employment they promote, Hezbollah stated that when they do participate in public appointments, they appoint people with merit - an approach they share with the PSP who also focus on the integrity of their own appointments rather than reform. Hezbollah therefore believe in reform by other means - through education, legislation and political pressure. Despite their work on a national strategy for reform through their Minister at OMSAR, they admit that any national strategy is bound to fail without the collective cooperation and support of other political parties. **Realistically, any matter needs everyone's agreement, and in the Lebanese government, "resistance to change is much more powerful than the will to change", Hezbollah states.**

However, Amal also acknowledged that such a system is unachievable, and therefore justify their rights to equal power-sharing capacities as other political parties/sects in the country. Their position is also closely linked to their identity as a party, which is based on Imam Sadr's representation of the 'underprivileged' mostly Shia community before the war, primarily based on their exclusion from decision-making power in the government. Since the reformation of the government with the Taif Accord did not coincide with a restructuring of government institutions, **Amal claimed that they entered into a government with a pre-set system for determining what sectors qualified as service sectors or not, and what ministries were considered primary as opposed to secondary.** They claimed that they considered the Ministry of Culture as being more essential than the Foreign Ministry, because they believe it is necessary "to build a common culture among the Lebanese people before being able to decide on issues of sovereignty or foreign policy". Amal Movement concurred that each party has their own priorities and that no cooperation exists between ministries. They stated that true and effective administrative reform as the complete restructuring of the Lebanese system based on a new electoral law with Lebanon being one electoral district based on proportionality, as well as a separation of power between the Legislative and the Executive Authorities, strengthening control agencies, and separating the judiciary from political affairs.

On the other hand, the PSP's approach to recruitment was interpreted in terms of the quality of education of the Lebanese citizen. According to the party, Lebanese schools teach students sciences,

but they do not educate them on how to behave. To that effect, the PSP have **created educational programs that involve discussions and workshops,** which they claim is creating a better learning environment. In this way, the PSP in effect **perceives management of public servants as the prerogative of each political party rather than the prerogative of the state.** They claim that no one is comfortable with the political situation, "except maybe the ministers", but practically, no one is comfortable because of the political deadlocks, and that they are facing more difficulties now that the Prime Minister is in effect the President (interview done before election of president). While maintaining that **the political-sectarian system is both necessary and problematic,** the PSP's position towards administrative reform is trying to guarantee that their ministers are good ministers, and cited the example of Wael Abou Faour (PSP Health Minister), who has managed to make several reforms to the Ministry of Health by reducing the cost of medication and allegedly making sure that no patient is denied admission to the hospital. They do admit however that it is the PSP's own political backing and protection that allows the minister to take these kinds of decisions. Their opinion is that given the current political context, they can't always commit to rigid strategies since they need to be flexible in order to make compromises. They assert that minorities and smaller sects are always under threat of being marginalized from the decision-making process. The PSP argued that administrative reform must happen through political reform, and that if there is corruption in the political class, it's impossible to reform the administration. This paradox means that there is no national unity government, but rather a government which facilitates compromises between political parties, which often leads to ineffective policies or reforms. **They claim that "administration is a result of policy, which is a result of the political reality. If we cannot change this political reality, we will remain this way. We need essential political reforms first".** According to the PSP, these reforms must address all constitutional institutions - the presidency must maintain its full executive authority, and the Parliament should be responsible for monitoring the Executive Authority and holding it accountable.

In light of the "culture of corruption in public administration and institutions and the violation of public posts and functions by political and armed organisation"[11], FM's political statement in 2009 stated that there is a **need to shrink the size of public administration by gradually reducing the number of public servants** and thus the costs of the public sector, to modernise, as they claim, administrative functions by introducing e-governance systems and capacity building programs, to reinforce transparency, merit-based recruitment, and control agencies, and finally to expand the authorities of regional units and decentralise planning and implementation through strengthening local authorities' planning and implementation. Siniora (2009) claimed that PM Siniora from FM, following the steps of former PM Rafiq Hariri (FM), aimed to (1) fil essential vacant grade 1 positions by appointing candidates though ad hoc recruitment committees, (2) draft laws introducing contractual employment and longer working hours, (3) draft laws for new accountability measures to improve expenditure control, (4) increase transparency through disclosure of state financial accounts. They stated that former PM Rafiq Hariri issued a resolution in 1993 to dismiss 320 employees for unethical practices and blatant corruption, however most sectarian parties regarded this as trespassing over 'sacred grounds'. Hariri, as a result, was unable to maintain this resolution. In addition, they argued that former PM Fouad Siniora introduced contractual employment in the public sector as an attempt to increase productivity and pave the way for meritocracy.

FM argued that the problem of public administration dates back to the establishment in 1943, which they state was never based on meritocracy but rather on 'national partnership' (*Al*

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11. The full statement is available in Future Movement (2009). "Political Statement: For Lebanon". Retrieved from http://www.almustaqbal.com/v4/Article.aspx?Type=np&Articleid=340898, August 2016.

Sharakah Al Watanyah) which was translated to 'sectarian partnership', the basis of the **Lebanese power-sharing formula.** FM plainly reported that if they approached the minister for a favor (to transfer someone for example), he would refuse but do exactly the same favor for his political partners. **The FM claimed that despite working to change this reality, they have learned over the years that political and sectarian loyalists in Lebanon are more likely to have less merit because it is often difficult to manage people with merit in sectarian politics.** FM claimed that "the people who supported us abandoned us because we only did things according to the law". They added that when a few reformists emerged over the years and they were blocked by the parliament as well as the people they represent, who expect their MP to secure them posts in public administration. Therefore, MPs are forced to engage in corrupt practices to secure their votes, FM argued. They contended that the majority of public servants are immune to accountability, the same way they are immune to merit-based recruitment. Finally, **FM stated that their political leaderships undesirably found the demands of the people more appealing than reform, and therefore they have succumbed to this reality by employing people who did not have the merit needed.**

Kataeb claimed to have a strong position against clientele-based recruitment, and that they have alienated many of their constituents by refusing to offer them public sector employment. Kataeb argued that issues pertaining to both the quantity and quality of public sector employees must be dealt with before addressing any reforms regarding public sector wages. They argue that these problems exist mainly due to the dysfunction of control agencies in Lebanon. Like the Future Movement, **Kataeb stated that there is a need to reduce down the number of public servants**. In its published political agenda *Aaqd Al-Esteqrar: Machroua Al-kataeb Al-Lobnaniyah* (2009)[12] (Stability Contract: The Agenda of Kataeb), Kataeb promoted reconsidering and defining the prerogatives of several high-level public posts including the presidency of the republic, the parliament and the council of ministers, and their respective deputies, as well as the internal bylaws that governs the parliament and the council of ministers. During the interview, Kataeb argued that most ministers introduced projects to serve their own villages or sphere of influence, and that most public tenders organized by quasi-governmental institutions were won by close relatives and acquaintances of politicians and public officials. To fight corruption, Kataeb noted that there is a need to implement the law against illicit enrichment and to introduce a new law against misuse of influence and power as well as embezzlement of public funds. It addition, Kataeb promoted transparency and the right to access information as well as the mechanisation of public administration. Kataeb stated that there is a need to abolish political sectarianism in public offices and to follow a merit-based recruitment and promotion system. In a recent statement on its website, Kataeb promoted the establishment of an independent ministry for administrative reform and accountability to fight corruption and the supremacy of political loyalty over loyalty to the institution and the public good[13].

Al-jama'ah also argued that the biggest barrier to reform is sectarian politics. They asserted that religions in Lebanon are meant to enrich it and not to create barriers in communication between the Lebanese people, and they believe that the problem lies in using those religions for political ends. They also argued that sectarian politics is more similar to feudalism than it it to sectarian representation. Under the banner of sectarian representation, sectarian leaders transform into feudal lords who "realistically end up neglecting their sects", and political representation

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12. The full agenda is available on: Kataeb (2009). http://kataeb.org/ استقرار-الكيان-والدولة-لا-اشراك-في- كتائبيات-/2016/02/23/السيادة (retrieved February 2016).

13. The full statement is available on: Kataeb (2016). http://www.kataeb.org/تشبيح-فساد-ووظيفة- أخبار/محليات/2016/08/04/رسمية(retrieved February 2016).

becomes instead an issue of feudal interests. Al-jama'ah claimed that this is why their main focus is creating the largest possible dialogue between the Lebanese people to reach the abolishment of the sectarian system. They argued that dialogue is necessary since abolishing the sectarian system cannot happen by decree, which they argued is likely to cause mistrust among the Lebanese people. Therefore, they claimed there is a need to prepare for such an audacious decision that transforms Lebanon from a sectarian coalition to a State for all Lebanese people, and this requires dialogue which convinces the Lebanese people and addresses their concerns regarding the threats they might face as a community. Al-jama'ah believed that the real challenge today is initiating this dialogue. They argued that dialogue should not be exclusive to political parties, but should also include CSO representatives as well as religious authorities, in order to guarantee freedom of religion but also separate religion from politics and state administration. There should be no red lines during this dialogue and no issue off the table - whether brought up by those who want to increase the leverage of sects or those who want to abolish sectarianism. They claimed that discussing these issues facilitates reaching a common ground as to where the role of sects ends and where the role of the state begins.

LF argued that the primary role of government should not be to provide public sector jobs to its constituents. They emphasized that reform is impossible in light of sect-based employment based on political affiliation. Instead, the LF claim that there is a need to reform the organisational structure and procedures of public sector recruitment, and to reduce the role the administration needs to play. The more mechanization, the simpler the procedures and policies, which reduces the role of administration and limits it to planning and monitoring execution rather than daily operations, especially if there is a big role to be played by the private sector. According to the LF, the main challenge against administrative reform is organisational structure that benefits certain groups. **Because many people rely economically on quasi-governmental institutions as well as client-based employment, the LF argues that dismantling this system is not in the interest of the ruling parties, and proves to be a continuous challenge.**

On public sector recruitment, the FPM also asserted that civil servants must be qualified and have integrity, and that a mechanism of accountability should be placed in order to hold them accountable. They also objected to the fact that "several of the members of the Higher Judiciary Council are appointed and not elected", and asserted that judiciary reform must necessarily precede administrative reform.When probed on what the party's specific initiatives are in terms of recruitment, the FPM clarified their intentions to carry out awareness campaigns on the issue. When probed as to whether the FPM is engaged in legislative or executive measures to address clientelist behavior and recruitment in the public sector, **the FPM frankly asserted that being part of the government is more important than dealing with administrative reform at the moment, particularly given that they are still in a transitional phase of becoming a political organisation, and therefore need to re-empower themselves on the political arena.** This position is very similar to the positions of the other political parties interviewed in this study, who asserted that their positions in the government have a large influence on the types of reforms they that can support, and therefore they prioritize decisions based on that basis. The FPM's current position towards reform prioritizes electoral reform based on proportional representation, which they claim would protect minority rights in Lebanon. However, the FPM also supports the Orthodox Law[14]. **They argued, given that the country is divided along sectarian lines, supporting the Orthodox Law is regrettably a realpolitik solution that the party can endorse.** Their initiative involves a proposal of a draft law for proportional representation in municipal elections. However, they claimed that the party faced pressure by members of Parliament when they introduced their draft law for municipal elections.

14. The Orthodox Law stipulates that each person is only allowed to elect MPs from the sect to which he/she belongs.

To conclude, both Kataeb and Hezbollah emphasised the need to have independent control agencies able to recruit and manage civil servants without being subjugated to political parties' infiltration to its decision-making process. However, the parties still seem to differ in terms of the jurisdictions they expect of these agencies. While Hezbollah argued that CSB's independence is integral, but that its jurisdiction should not extend to the Cabinet, Kataeb argued that it is particularly problematic that the CSB's subservience and dependence on the Cabinet. Kataeb recommended that the role of the ENA in training and recruitment civil servants should be reclaimed. Kataeb stated that they are studying the possibility to shift control agencies' responsibilities, particularly towards public procurement, to the Higher Judiciary Council, which in their opinion is independent and can hold the executive power accountable. Their other suggestions are either to make control agencies part of the jurisdictions of the president of the republic or the parliament. The FM recommended to circumvent the problem of control agencies' dependence on the executive powers by establishing a new independent body altogether to manage the process of public procurement. Whereas, Al-jama'ah had a reformative and less radical stance on this issue, and stated they have been part of the Committee for Administration and Justice studying the possibility of widening the jurisdictions as well as improving the role and accountability mechanisms of the CSB.

DRM, Kataeb, and LF referred to the excessive jurisdictions of quasi-governmental institutions as particularly problematic, while Al-jama'ah pointed out that the problem with quasi-governmental institutions isn't necessarily structural (i.e. overlapping with other agencies' or ministries jurisdictions), but it is rather functional pertaining to the process of appointing its staff based on sectarian or political affiliation. On the other hand, the FM emphasised that dismantling any of the quasi-governmental institutions necessitate reforming all of them including the CDR, Council of the South, and the Fund for the Displaced, as most of these institutions have a sectarian majority.

And finally the majority of political parties contended that there are several reasons behind disrupting institutional processes including ministers' freedom from any obligations to uphold the reforms and strategies of their predecessors preventing institutions to benefit from their legacy and accumulated experiences, as well as capital and vigilante power whose influence often overpower and interrupt the process of public institutions and undermine its decisions.

Only two political parties (DRM and Al-jama'ah) did not emphasise political leverage as a condition for administrative reform. The majority of political parties including Amal, PSP, FM, LF, FPM, and Hezbollah emphasised the necessity of political leverage prior to the development of any reform strategies. For example, Kataeb indicated that they had prepared a strategy to be implemented when a political opportunity allows them to do so. When the LF was asked why it would invest in goals that it identified as unachievable, the party claimed that such preparation lightens the load when the political opportunity arises for implementation. Given the fact that this approach, although proactive, is essentially dependent on political opportunity, the extent to which it is an effective approach is still debatable.

Although these political parties drew on the necessity for functional and structural administrative reform, when probed on whether these measurements have any chance to confront the influence of administrative quotas, patronage and clientalism, the majority of political parties stated that administrative reform in Lebanon is meaningless if not preceded with political reform, indicating that true independent and merit-based public administration in the current political system is a threat to their existential concerns as a sectarian community. This is reflected in the PSP, Hezbollah, FM, FPM and Amal Movement's justification to participate in the status-quo practices, allegedly in order to secure their communities' share of the decision-making process. Therefore, they stated that being part of the administrative distribution of power in place and in the meantime is more important than administrative reform, and that their attempts to reform are tentative and cannot be regarded as certain.

Chapter Six: Political Parties' Internal Administration

This chapter presents the various internal administrative configurations of political parties. Although these parties share certain structural elements, the mechanisms through which they organize their administration differ slightly in light of the specific history of each of these parties.

Kataeb is one of the oldest remaining traditional parties in Lebanon and claimed to have inherited a 65-year old democratic process. However, recognizing that some of these processes are outdated, they reported that their new organisational structure was voted on to secure election to political office as president of the party, directly by the electoral base, over two stages - i.e. by electing local representatives who in turn elect the political leadership responsible for appointing the executive leadership of the party. **Kataeb's recruitment process is heavily centralized, meaning that recruitment of personnel must pass through the Secretary General's office.** New members undergo a screening process that directs them to the areas in which they can be most effective. Job descriptions are used to specify the goal of each party unit and the role of the person employed. Promotion or demotion in the party is not based on the person's productivity but rather on their effectiveness in their area of specialization. Their mechanism of evaluation is also centralized and conducted in practice by monitoring the performance of each unit. An annual inventory of all memorandums conducted by the party is audited by the Secretary General of the party, who monitors and evaluates these reports. This inventory reveals the number of meetings, who conducted them, the activities, and so on, which are estimated to be around 4000-6000 activities each year. The evaluations are then presented to the heads of each unit concerned. Kataeb claim that this method of presenting objective quantitative performance evaluations helps circumvent the customary norm of egos running high within political parties in Lebanon, and facilitates accountability by depersonalizing assessments.

The internal administration of Al-jama'ah al-islamiyah appeared to be the most structured of the parties interviewed. Elections are held for most of the positions in the party, so each sector concerned elects its own representative, whether at the administrative level - at the level of regional offices - or at the level of sectors, where opportunities for promotion are based on years of experience. **Internal needs assessments are facilitated through the Bureau of Planning and Habilitation, which is responsible for studying HR inside the party,** based on which trainings are organized to develop its human resources. There are two types of positions in the party, the first, which is larger and voluntary, is not compensated. The second type of position is filled by full-time members, and Al-jama'ah relies on an employment system involving job descriptions and specifications based on which members are employed to particular positions. **High-ranking executive members are all volunteers and are elected. Active members of the party elect representatives to the Consultative Board on the basis of regional representation.** The Consultative Board, which represents all Al-jama'ah members in the regions, is responsible for electing the Secretary General, who acts as the head of the Executive Committee. The Secretary General is responsible for appointing members to the Executive Committee based on their fields of expertise, and in consultation with the Consultative Board. The Executive Committee is a combination of regional representatives and specialists. The **Consultative Board is the highest control authority inside the party,** and annually resolves the budget and discusses the executive office's administrative report in detail, and makes resolutions and recommendations based on that. Every other level of administration in the party has its own process of evaluation through a mechanism set in place for monitoring and reporting. **At the end of every organisational period (3 years), the party re-evaluates their policies and procedures in case they are in need of amendment.**

The PSP stated that it had recently **reformed its constitution and bylaws, stipulating that the executive authority is no longer limited to the President and is to be shared with the Secretary General.** The reform also stipulates that the party's leadership positions are to be elected by the General Assembly, which includes around 500 members, according to regions and local needs. A representative for Baalbek must be elected from Baalbek for example, whereas election for the central administration includes all regions. Internally, the PSP focuses on building the integrity of their members and re-connecting with values of honor. Similarly, their position towards public administration also revolves around the integrity of their ministers and MPs. The PSP claims that its position towards recruitment both internally and at the state level is that it **should be based on a standard of ethics and morality.** The identity of the party is closely entwined with the person of Kamal Jumblatt, both as a leader and as a thinker, and the mentor-like relationship he had with the members of the party. While the PSP was a historically significant party in Lebanon, their membership has dwindled in recent years. Despite that, their representation of the Druze community in the Lebanese government guarantees their place in the decision-making process, their reform priorities are largely shaped by factors that influence **their existential presence in Lebanon as a political community**.

The FM stated that the General Assembly elects 22 members of 100 nominees for their Political Office, which **elects the president of the party and appoint the secretary general. District and area coordinators are appointed by the Political Office as well.** The FM claims that they expect the coming elected Political Office to place a new mechanism for elections in local communities. So for example, the people of Tripoli would elect the coordinator rather than have him appointed by the Political Office. There are around 1800 deputies, of which 1150 are deputies from local communities, while the rest are appointed by the president to participate in the assembly (to account for gender and sectarian diversity).

Amal, Hezbollah, and the Democratic Renewal Movement revealed little about their internal administration and information pertaining to its recruitment and evaluation practices was relatively unavailable. The Democratic Renewal Movement stated that their internal bylaws are not to be shared with the public but they stated that they conduct systematic evaluations and needs assessments at the level of their party's various organisational functions. Although information on Hezbollah's internal organisation was withheld due to security reasons, it is fair to assume, given the party's military capabilities, that their internal administrative organisation is also heavily structured and centralized.

The Lebanese Forces' newly **developed internal bylaws included around 300 articles** which encompass all political party operations, including recruitment mechanisms, and each sector has its set of specific bylaws cording to the objective of each unit. However, the LF's administrative structure is less centralized than Kataeb, and allows some measure of flexibility when it comes to means of implementation despite the overarching organisational structure governing the party. The Secretary General is appointed by the President of the party who is elected by the members, and the LF recruits to include the largest possible number or members rather than recruitment for specific tasks or specialties. Most positions in the party are elected, including the eleven members of the Executive Committee and the Vice President, meaning that 90% of the positions in the party are elected and not appointed. **The President is responsible for evaluating those he appoints,** while each person is vertically accountable to his superior based on productivity. If the members are dissatisfied with the president's appointments, **they have the electoral freedom not to re-elect him** on that basis. The LF claimed that this electoral freedom leaves room for the democratic process to take place, and also safeguards against the inheritance of positions and guarantees the legitimacy of

the President of the party. The LF stated that this democratic process upholds a measure of accountability within the party and towards its members. The LF emphasizes that it has made great strides to transition from a military group to the only political party in Lebanon with an administrative structure that qualifies for ISO standards.

The FPM noted that the party is going through a transitional phase in attempt to move away from being a party that emerged through the war to a political organisation. Currently, FPM's internal administration is distributed across 24 District Commissions, which constitute the geographical regions wherein the party is active. The internal electoral process at the popular level starts by proportional elections from a closed list of candidates - elected members include the party coordinator, secretary, and treasurer, as well as the Judiciary Council, which consists of four members. However, the Judiciary Council is not elected by popular vote but rather by the party MPs and the party Attorneys. Each district commission consists of a group of representatives including a human resources representative, an electoral campaign representative, etc. In terms of recruitment, positions in Committees are filled through interviews conducted by the party's internal administration, after which a list is recommended to the president of the party who makes the final decision. Finally, the president is elected by the members of the party directly.

FPM's internal bylaws[15] show that the president is at the same time the head of the executive board, the political board and the national board. Despite that many positions are elected by party members including the president, the president enjoys an extended authority that ranges from appointing to questioning and dismissing many high-level critical positions as well as any member, including the secretary, several executive board members (coordinators of central committees), as well as 6 of the 9 members of the Adjudication Board, which is responsible for holding party members accountable including the president himself. On the other hand, the LF's internal bylaws[16] show that district coordinators are appointed by the president in collaboration with the executive board. **The president of the LF is the head of the executive board and the central board, and he is also in charge of appointing high-rank positions such as the secretary general as well as the latter's assistants.** The executive board in collaboration with the secretary general are in charge of appointing the president of LF's internal inspection board which is responsible for financial and administrative inspection and is subject to the direct authority of the president of the party, who has the right to grant special amnesty for expelled members.

To conclude, the data on parties' internal administrative structures as well as the examination of the available published internal bylaws show that the majority of political parties' internal administrations and control agencies, with the exception of Al-jama'ah, can be described as highly centralised and dependent on the authority and vision of the president and his appointed executive board. This reveals that the nature of the authority that exists within political parties and how they are managed internally reflects the nature of the authority that exists in public administration at the larger level, in that this authority is highly centralized, and is dependent on the president and executive powers and its political decisions rather than on its institutional prerogative as well as a degree of individual autonomy and creativity.

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15. FPM's internal bylaws are available on their website:
    http://static.tayyar.org/Content/uploads/PdfLibrary/150729022020655~النظام%20الداخلي،%20العام %20النهائي،%202015.pdf (retrieved August 2016).
16. LF's internal bylaws are available on their website: http://www.lstatic.org/PDF/LF-Law/lf-internal-regulation.pdf (retrieved August 2016).

Chapter Seven: Conclusion

The formation of political parties in Lebanon is closely intertwined with the structure of its government and public administration, as well as the heterogeneity of its population and the claim for representation. Many political parties in Lebanon were formed through decades of political struggle for representation and control over resources throughout the regions of what now constitutes Lebanon. Contrary to the formation of political parties in developing nations, ideologies adopted by Lebanese political parties are not limited to a national vision or strategy for the country, but rather assume a natural right to exist and take part in the government as an extension of their political/sectarian identity due to the consociational system.

The study reveals that political parties' perspective towards administrative reform, both internally and externally, is framed by their political interests, constrained by their political opportunities, and inextricably subject to power-sharing arrangements fortified by political consensus. In light of this reality, each of the parties interviewed tailored their positions towards administrative reform to fit their political positions, and more importantly, their existential requirements. These existential requirements are mainly dependent on the communities which they represent. These communities in turn wield certain expectations from their representatives, and in line with the central theme, are identity based (e.g. sect-based employment in the public sector). All the political parties interviewed admitted to this vicious cycle that perpetuates the sectarian system.

All parties interviewed claim that political reform is the only way effective administrative reform can be achieved, however they also admitted that such a feat risks alienating minorities or certain sectarian communities from the decision-making process. There is a wide-held belief among political parties that comprehensive reform risks social instability, and in light of each party's limited influence in the government, they choose to approach administrative reform along the lines of e-governance, decentralization, and privatization. In light of political contention, each party works on its individual strategies with little collaboration of partnership with other political parties, despite their common goals, choosing instead to take advantage of political opportunities. Reform priorities are largely shaped by factors that influence political parties' existential presence as a political community.

Within this consociational system that governs Lebanon, there is little hope for parties to bring about reform as this will challenge their main source of popularity and the direct interests of their leaders. Parties are using the public administration system as a means of buying the support of members of their sectarian group and there is no reason why they would stop doing that if they can get away with it. If reform was possible during the Chehab period, it is a far-fetched dream post Taif Agreement where the country can come to a halt if the political parties failed to agree on how to cut the cake.

Heavy centralisation of authority at the level of political parties' internal administration is also reflected in the nature of authority legitimized at the level of public administration. It echoes the relatively golden time of the establishment when control agencies relied on the support of the president and their sustainability were seriously contested after Chehab ceased to be president. Despite the effectiveness of this traditional authority within political parties, it cannot replace legal standards and institutional procedures. Political parties such as the PSP, Kataeb, LF, FM, Amal, and Hezbollah, knew very well that their exercise of domination is limited to their constituencies, and the degree to which they share administrative positions only gives them a higher leverage of

political and economic claims on behalf of their communities. In addition, they were aware that the ceiling of their political activity and representation does not promote them to state and national domination over the various others equally, and therefore capitalizing on sectarian politics became the only viable choice for their investment.

Corruption, bribery, and embezzlement of public funds have always been characteristic features of any debate on public administration in developed and under developed countries around the world. However, what particularly characterises public administration in Lebanon is the heavy centralisation of these features which goes back to the Ottoman Empire. Nonetheless, the Lebanese centralisation should not be understood as a concentration of control in the hands of one authority. It should rather be understood as a concentration of multi-centric authorities in a club of influence often limited to those who can secure communal representation. Club members are often expected to make claims on behalf of their sects for a 'fair' share of power and resources. The latter is often translated in claims for public posts and economic privileges. Lebanese public officials were not expected by a large majority of the general public to make claims for social justice and equity on behalf of all citizens and for all citizens. However, they have been often expected to make claims on behalf of their geographically-confined sectarian constituencies. Following this system of recruitment and the supremacy of consensual politics over institutional procedures meant that each political party functions as an ad-hoc human resources management for public institutions assigned to their respective candidates regardless of the institutional process set in place, and the permanent subservience of common national interests to factional political interests.

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